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Professor and Chairperson of the Department of Advanced Studies, Leadership and Policy in the
School of Education and Urban Studies at Morgan State University.
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Prelude

The guiding theme that has given impetus to the federal government’s
continued involvement in issues of accreditation has been that the government
has sought to increase its control of higher education through accreditation. As
Pedersen (2005) surmises, “…the federal government has chosen to use the
regional associations as a "Trojan horse" to exert greater influence on
accreditation.”

However, if representatives of Department of Education are

asked, they will claim that the department has been motivated by an honest
desire to ensure that the public is not misled by false claims of quality and value
made by colleges and universities.

On the contrary, most colleges and
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universities would disagree, claiming that the government has been simply
attempting to use accreditation to force higher education to adopt policies and
practices that advance a political ideology.

Introduction

This work highlights how politics and philosophical ideology becomes
innately linked to higher education whenever the government subjects the
accrediting community to its ideological philosophy. While many believed that the
actions of Secretary Spellings were new encroachments on the accrediting
community, the authors’ body of work traced a consistent pattern of how the
federal government has chosen to use the regional associations as a “Trojan
horse” to exert greater influence on higher education. According to Bolman and
Deal (p. 185, 2003), “In traditional structural views, organizations are guided by
goals and policies set at the top.” The government is no exception. In tracing the
government’s role in accreditation, a profusion of contradictory goals and policies
have been uncovered. Some emerged from a desire to win the hearts and minds
of society, as in President Truman’s populist promotion of vocational schools and
community colleges. Others developed as a result of political ideology like the
1980s rise of the conservative movement. Yet, many emerged as a result of the
government’s desire to control accreditation, like in its attempted takeover in the
1992 amendments of the Higher Education Act of 1965.
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Once again, another Bush Administration, through the Commission on the
Future of Higher Education, called for scrapping the current system of
accreditation, in favor of a National Accreditation Foundation that was to be
created by Congress and the President (Dillon, S., April 12, 2006).

At a

symposium sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, Charles Miller, the
former Spellings Commission chairman, called for an alternative to accreditation
in which investors or others interested in creating new forms of higher education
would gain the ability to operate (and award federal financial aid) “prospectively,”
rather than having to wait years to gain an accreditor’s imprimatur (Lederman,
September 24, 2007).

“For every old idea, a new one is created which conflicts with it. Out of the
struggle, a new idea is created, (Hegel).”

What pernicious philosophy to believe that accreditation, the American
system for maintaining standards in higher education (Seldon, 1960), should be
scrapped and replaced by a national government system, or even worse, as
Chairman Miller suggests, an alternative form of accountability system
administered by investors or others interested in creating new forms of higher
education.

Why not? Let’s have a higher education system for maintaining

standards that’s manipulated by investors and driven by the volatility of the stock
market. Although the topic was far from front and center in the commission’s
report, the Education Department had put changes in accreditation at the fulcrum
of its campaign to force higher education institutions to be more accountable to
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the public (Lederman, September 24, 2006). It was quite unfortunate that the
Commission on the Future of Higher Education sought to take out it rage for the
Republican loss of the 2006 mid-term elections on accreditation.

Had the

Republicans retained control of Congress, the national discourse on the future of
higher education would have been quite different, and all stakeholders would be
meticulously in quest of solutions for the problem of access; cost and
affordability;

a

broken

financial

aid

system;

evidence-based

learning;

transparency and accountability; and innovation in all aspects of post-secondary
education.
In

her

issue

paper,

“Assuring

Quality

in

Higher

Education—

Recommendations for Improving Accreditation,” Vickie Schray proposed that the
Secretary of Education create a National Accreditation Working Group, with
broad involvement of all major accreditation stakeholders, to develop a national
blueprint for transforming accreditation (Schray, 2006). Ms. Schray continues the
federalization theme by proposing that the governance of the National
Recognition Process adopt standards used by the Department to recognize
accreditation organizations; and that the current peer review system be replaced
with formally trained and certified independent reviewers that are experts in the
application of national accreditation standards. This is where the Post-Modernist
begs the question: “Who has the right to change whom, and with what
responsibility?” In his issue paper, on behalf of Chairman Charles Miller, Robert
C. Dickerson described accreditation of higher education in the United States as
a crazy-quilt of activities, processes and structures that is fragmented, arcane,
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and more historical than logical, which had outlived its usefulness (Dickerson,
2006). In his paper, Dickerson’s proposed the creation of a new organization, in
which the Congress and the President enact legislation to create The National
Accreditation Foundation, operating with new standards and processes. But like
most of the Issue Papers written on behalf of the Commission, this one also lacks
specifics.

It was irresponsible to deface the existing system of maintaining

standards in higher education, and not put forth specific measures and
governance structures for replacing accreditation.

In short Dickerson was

proposing the Federalization of accreditation.

The federalization of accreditation was certainly not a new concept – we
have been here before.

It was during the 1992 reauthorization of the HEA

provisions that higher education leaders last witnessed the government’s might,
and its most punitive attack on the institutional autonomy of accreditation. In the
midst of debate on the reauthorization of this 1992 Higher Education Act that
Congress’ hostility reached a crisis stage, threatening to bring to a close the role
of accrediting agencies as gatekeepers for federal financial aid (Bloland, 2001).
Congress was particularly concerned about the public accountability of
institutions whose graduates had high student loan default rates. As such,
Congress held accrediting agencies responsible for this state of affairs,
especially the regional accrediting bodies that had gate keeping functions with
regards to Title IV funds for student loans (Altmaire, 2002). Subpart 1 of Part H
of the 1992 Higher Education Act amendments empowered the states in
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determining the eligibility of institutions to participate in the student financial aid
programs of Title IV (Bloland). Congress consequently authorized the Secretary
of Education to designate one State Postsecondary Review Entity (SPREs) in
each State to be responsible for the conduct and coordination of the review of
institutions of higher education for the purposes of determining eligibility under
Title IV (United States Statutes at Large, 1992).
Subpart 1 of Part H of the 1992 Higher Education Act amendments was
quite damaging to accrediting. No accrediting agency or association was to be
regarded by the Secretary to be a reliable authority as to the quality of education
or training offered for the purposes of this Act or for other Federal purposes,
unless the agency or association met standards established by the Secretary
(United States Statutes at Large, 1992). Additionally, Subpart 1 of Part H of the
1992 Higher Education Act amendments outlined the standards and procedures
to be used by the United States Department of Education (USDE) secretary to
certify eligibility of institutions for Title IV funding, and gave authority to the
secretary to set up a master database of accreditation, eligibility, and certification
(Bloland, 2001). In the 1992 amendments, the Secretary of the Department of
Education essentially functioned much like the Minister of Education in a
centralized national education system like the British. The Secretary was the
ultimate national authority for quality and accountability in higher education. As in
the European system, the Secretary acted as a unitary authority accountable
only to a head of state.

In addition to accrediting duties, the SPREs were

charged with monitoring federal student aid programs, assessing outcomes, and
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uncovering illegal and fraudulent activities. Any, or a combination of these
infractions, were considered by the Secretary to be “triggers” that indicated that
an institution needed be immediately review for fraudulent activities against the
federal government’s financial aid programs. Title IV, “Part H—Program Integrity
Triad,” was called the flagship Statute of the 1992 Reauthorization of the 1965
Higher Education Act.
SPREs would have not gotten anywhere had it not been for at least two
extremely egocentric persons who were spearheading it from the States
Agencies. The true authors of SPREs were David Longanecker, then Chairman
of the State Higher Education Executives Organization (SHEEO) and Don Nolan,
Former Deputy Commissioner of Higher Education, Board of Regents, and New
York State Department of Education. They believed that they could have done a
better job than the regional accreditation agencies. Mr. Longanecker noted that
most private colleges have no qualms about accepting billions of dollars a year in
federal student aid, and as such we have a responsibility to taxpayers to have
some system of accountability (Jaschik, May 26, 1995). However, due to a lack
of available funding to transform accreditation into a government entity, the 1998
reauthorization of the Higher Education Act eliminated language authorizing
State Postsecondary Review Entities, which were written into the law in 1992 to
oversee postsecondary institutions (Stephen, 1998).

College officials praised

lawmakers for acting against the new investigative units. "This is very important,
because the SPREs brought a level of federal involvement with institutional
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decisions that we think is inappropriate," said Gordon A. Haaland, president of
Gettysburg College (Jaschik, May 26, 1995).

Have we not learnt from the past? There is no greater example of the
government’s failure to federalize accreditation like the ascend and crash of
SPREs. So here were the central questions to for the contemporary architects
who were attempting to federalize accreditation: If the government did not rely on
accrediting bodies what would happen?

In the absence of the regional and

specialized agencies, what would the government put in place as the American
system for maintaining standards in higher education? Do we adopt a Britishstyle centralized government higher education system, like the one being
recommended by Sir Michael in which states send government and inspectors
directly into schools to search for causes of poor performance, review school
leadership, and suggest changes (Dillon, August 15, 2007)? Or is the solution
the establishments of a federal bureaucracy like that which was proposed by the
Commission on the Future of Higher Education – the National Accreditation
Foundation?

Even in the face of such historical precedent, the Department of Education
attempted to muscle the accreditation community -- through a series of illegal
negotiated rule-making, intended to use accreditation bodies -- to carry out some
of the recommendations from the Commission on the Future of Higher Education
August, 2006 report (Bollag, February, 2007).

The Department of Education
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actions were illegal because, negotiated rule-making only occurs after the
Congress legislates the Reauthorization of the 1965 Higher Education Act. In
response to a barrage of criticisms, Vickie Schray, a senior department official
who was leading the negotiations, said, “We felt it was worthwhile to see what
could be done under current statutory authority (Bollag).” Translation:

after

reluctantly accepting defeat that a National Accreditation System was impossible,
the Department of Education wanted to use accreditation to federalize the
recommendations of the Commission on the Future of Higher Education before
the Bush Administration’s term runs out. When the Department of Education was
conducting the three negreg sessions, their whole objective was to federalize
accreditation, and take the responsibility for making decisions on quality and
accountability, away from institutions, through accreditation agencies, and put it
in the hands of the federal government.

Remember, there was no Higher

Education Amendments to guide the actions of the Secretary Spelling’s negreg
sessions. For that reason they had no legal standing, because the Legislative
Branch has not reauthorized the 1965 Higher Education Act as yet.
In late May, 2007, just days before the rule-making process on
accreditation was to conclude, Senator Lamar Alexander, Republican of
Tennessee, former secretary of education and ranking minority member on the
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee, accused the Bush
administration of “proposing to restrict autonomy, choice and competition.”
Alexander wrote to Secretary Spellings, telling her to leave these thorny issues to
Congress. The Secretary promptly complied (Traub, September 30, 2007).
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There is no dispute that serious challenges face American Higher
Education. According to Measuring Up 2006, the United States is 7th in the
world (behind Canada, Japan, Korea, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), in
educational attainment of young adults (ages 25-34), and 14th internationally in
college completion (Measuring Up 2006). However, the questions at hand were:
“Who was best positioned to set standards for what students should learn, and
who should establish minimum levels to measure student performance, and
achievement – Colleges, accrediting bodies, or the government? Accreditation
agencies responded resoundingly by siding with Dr. Eaton, that the Colleges,
rather that the government or accrediting bodies, need to place greater emphasis
on student-learning outcomes, and only the Colleges should decide the criteria
for measuring those outcomes (Basken, April, 2007). The institution is the only
entity that is in a position to deal with this issue of quality -- whether you’re
determining program outcomes, institutional effectiveness, student learning
outcomes, student achievement, it’s the institution, and not the accrediting
bodies. The accreditation agencies are just there to assure quality – to make
sure that the institutions have protocol standards in place so that a judgments
about the extent to which institutions are meeting the requirements are assessed.

In tracing the government’s role in accreditation, a profusion of
contradictory goals and policies have been uncovered. Even though the
Commission on the Future of Higher Education’s own report recommended that,
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“Postsecondary education institutions should measure and report meaningful
student learning outcomes,” the Department of Education spent months rulemaking -- attempting to force accreditation bodies to carryout the Commission’s
recommendations. Albeit, the Commission explicitly recommends that faculty
must be at the forefront of defining educational objectives for students, and,
developing meaningful, evidence-based measures of their progress toward those
goals. Notwithstanding, higher education institutions should measure student
learning using quality-assessment data from instruments which measures the
growth of student learning taking place in colleges (Commission, September,
2006). To the contrary, the Department of Education actions, -- and at times,
hegemonic ideologies -- transformed the discussion on the future of higher
education, into a discourse of regulatory authority versus institutional autonomy.
We must return the discussion on the future of higher education in American
Colleges and Universities to one of voluntary accountability.

“For every old idea, a new one is created which conflicts with it. Out of the
struggle, a new idea is created, (Hegel).”

Secretary Spelling’s unsuccessful negreg sessions exerted painstaking
pressure that was intended to force the accreditation bodies to use its authority
on Colleges to have campuses become transparent and show performance
evidence that they are educating their students based on measurable outcomes.
The government’s focus should have been on the Colleges, and not the
accrediting bodies. However, out of the struggle of the negreg sessions emerged
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a new idea to create a voluntary system of accountability (VSA), in which the
institutions would collect and make public a broad range of information about
their performance (Lederman April 10, 2006). VSA is the brain-child of the
National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, and the
American Association of State Colleges and Universities.

Responding to the challenges of the Spellings’ Commission for “a robust
culture of accountability and transparency throughout higher education” (U. S.
Department of Education, 2006, p. 21), the American Association of State
Colleges and Universities (AASCU) and the National Association of State
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) are engaged in a joint effort to
develop a voluntary system of accountability, a project aiming to make the public
get access to the broad information about institutions, ranging from accurate
tuition costs to institutional performance in meeting core learning outcomes
(Jones, 2007). According to AASCU (2007b), over the course of the next year,
AASCU and NASULGC, with funding assistance from The Lumina Foundation for
Education, will engage their members in the development of the system with the
purpose of widely adopting it.

Task Forces Developing VSA
AASCU and NASULGC have formed seven task forces that address
different issues respectively when implementing the VSA project (AASCU,
2007a, 2007b). Situated in a leading position, the Presidential Advisory
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Committee is charged with providing guidance to the task forces and work
groups.
The System Design and Information Task Force is in charge of exploring
overall questions about the VSA; while the Student and Family Information Task
Force is charged to answer, “What information would be most helpful to
prospective students and their parents in deciding which university best fits their
educational wants and needs”, and to address information related to costs of
attendance, retention of students and graduation rate outcomes. The Campus
Engagement Task Force is responsible for identifying instruments that
comprehensively measure student engagement with the campus as well as the
methods used to report those instruments and gather information for those
instruments. The Core Educational Outcomes Task Force will focus on how the
academy can develop useful and credible performance indicators for student
learning outcomes and student growth outcomes.
In addition, two technical work groups will be affiliated with the Core
Educational Outcomes Task Force to assist its work. One is Technical Work
Group on Learning Outcomes, which centers on identifying a small number of
educational outcome assessment instruments with the intent of facilitating
comparison. The other is Technical Work Group on Student Growth Outcomes,
which focuses on developing a list of student growth domains that institutions
should assess and demonstrate value added, and take into account items of
psychosocial change, attitudes and values, moral development and use of
reflective judgment.
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Advantages of VSA
According to Carey (2007), “Humans are fallible; they work harder and
better if they know someone else is paying attention to how well they do. The
same is true for institutions (p. 26). And the federal government policies the
activities of institutions in student financial aid, and that’s very important because
there is a lot of money involved and there can be fraud (Fusco, 2005). This
sentiment was recently echoed by Dr. Kirwan, Chancellor, University System of
Maryland, “Before asking people to pay a large amount of money, higher
education institutions have the responsibility for giving “them the information they
need to make an informed, educated choice by providing clear, concise,
relatively standardized data that can be compared across institutions” (2007, p.
23-24). By making institutional performance data availability and transparent to
the public, all stakeholders will be better equipped to make data-driven decisions
about the performance of postsecondary institutions. The VSA initiative is
intended to enable prospective students and their families to understand the
details of individual institutions by having access to a trustworthy source of
standard data.
This Voluntary System of Accountability promises to put in place policies
and procedures that can strengthen the mutual, cooperative relationships
between higher learning institutions and the legislators and other policy makers
by providing for transparent and comparable data that they have been calling for.
“Until higher education is more transparently and strongly accountable”, it will
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neither “be able to compete for public support with Medicaid, K-12 education, and
public safety”, nor will “be able to convince policymakers to fund student
financial-aid programs at levels that match rapidly rising college costs…” (Carey,
2007, p. 29).
A Voluntary System of Accountability will engage all faculty and staff, and
consequently empower them to build a better understanding of their institution on
a broad scale. Data on such issues like student engagement and learning
outcomes will “allow faculty and staff to gain additional knowledge on student
learning and student development at their institution”, and resultantly, “determine
whether curricular or other change is needed to improve the ability of their
students to succeed as employees or in graduate studies” (“The Voluntary
System”, 2007, P. 8-9). Although VSA outlines a structure for Colleges to follow,
many contemporary University leaders have begun to put systems in place that
will streamline data-driven decision making for improving their institution’s
performance. When Dr. Todd became President of the University of Kentucky,
his first action was to devise a system for rating state universities which involved
measuring indicators like graduation rates; the academic quality of entering
students; the number of Ph.D.’s being produced; the scholarly citations and
awards amassed by the faculty members; and the dollar value of federal
research grants awarded to the faculty members. Then, they designated
Benchmarks were then designed to measure the University’s progress.
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Disadvantages of VSA
According to David Eubanks, Director of Planning, Assessment, and
Information Services at Coker College, “a national metric for comparing
institutions based on a standardized test like the Collegiate Learning Assessment
(CLA) would be a disaster, except for the test publishers” (2006). He indicated
that huge incentives would be created to improve the test scores by all means,
leading to coaching, faking, and invalidating the scores. Similarly, Pascarella and
Terenzini concluded “simple displays based on institutional averages can be
misleading if used by prospective students to pick the right school”, holding that
“individual student performance typically varies much more within institutions
than average performance does between institutions” (as cited in Kuh, 2007, p.
32). The number of the institutions that will participate may have a negative
impact on the effectiveness of the VSA. According to Morse (2007), “only a small
proportion of four-year colleges will most likely to participate” since the system is
voluntary by definition. Outcomes from the National Survey of Student
Engagement, and the Collegiate Learning Assessment should not be used as a
“one size fit all” national metric for comparing postsecondary institutions. The
performance indicators of higher education institutions are much more complex
than purchasing an automobile.
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Summary
The responsibility to provide students with the highest quality of education
possible is the prevailing concern for colleges and universities. To its credit, the
Commission on the Future of Higher Education government addressed these
shortcomings that have taken place in our higher education institutions. However,
due to a perceived lack of action by the institutions, and accrediting agencies, the
federal government wants to enact accountability and performance measures to
make sure that Colleges and Universities focus more on outputs that promote
student success. Nevertheless, because of personal desires for promotion of
political ideologies, and even basic power struggles, the government’s
involvement in accreditation has proven to be a conflict of interest. Though the
governments’ intentions for accreditation and higher education may appear to be
noble, the evidence of their actions to exert influence and ultimately federalize
accreditation has been the outcome.

The

federal

government’s

involvement

in

accreditation

post

the

Commission on the Future of Higher Education report is maligned with
contradictions in their goals and policies which ultimately come from their innate
nature as politicians to placate and please society. As such, authorities tried to
come up with replacements for accreditation utilizing the government, but these
replacements lack specifics, and all in all lead to a federalization of accreditation.

Closing the Loop on Regulatory Authority vs. Institutional Autonomy in an Age of Accountability“ Charles & Simmons, 2008

Page 17

Accreditation has long been under attack by the government, and with each
attack, there have been failures in the system along with injustices. With
intimidation and strong-arming, the government has chosen to threaten the
significance of the accreditation community, and has even recommended that
higher learning institutions be placed under the control of a politically driven
machines, to be managed by result driven investors.

In light of these governmental regulatory challenges which have continued
to encroach upon the autonomy of institutions and accreditation agencies, higher
education leaders must assert greater control. The institution is the only one in
position to deal with this issue of quality, not accreditation agencies. These
agencies should only ensure quality, and enforce protocols and standards.
Autonomy, consistent with mission, must be the domain of the institutions.

Consistent with Hegel’s theory of change, the Voluntary System of
Accountability (VSA) has been one of the compromises in dealing with the
federal government’s involvement in assessing student learning outcomes. In this
system, institutions would collect and make a public, a broad range of information
about their performance. The system would intact task forces to address
pertinent information such as; what information is most helpful to prospective
parents and students in deciding which university best fits their educational wants
and needs, assessment and facilitating, comparisons, student growth domains.
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According to Kirwan (2007), the nation “has entered a new era of public
accountability”, in which higher education receives a significant amount of
taxpayer support and sizable funding from the students as well due to the rising
operation costs and fees (p. 22). Under such circumstances, the VSA intends to
provide the public with comparable information on higher education institutions
by using a common format. So the system “gets credit for being the only such
effort underway that will include outcomes and assessment data” (Morse, 2007).

As all stakeholders move to enacting this omnibus 2008 Reauthorization
of the 1965 Higher Education Act, it is important that governmental agencies do
not lose sight of the true goal of their efforts. In the struggle for power and
respect it is easy to forget the ones the fight is being fought for. The students are
the most important entity in this struggle for control and influence, and there
needs to be consistent and effective evaluations of their institutions to ensure
that they are being provided with the tools to make them achieve to the level at
which they are capable. Accrediting agencies have a track record of evaluating
evidence.
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